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THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER TREATMENT





Eric Clark was a typical high school student.] He performed well in
school and sports, and was selected as a member of the homecoming court
both his freshman and sophomore years. 2  However, things changed
drastically as Clark began to suffer from chronic paranoid schizophrenia.
3
He came to believe that his hometown of Flagstaff, Arizona was populated
with aliens, including some in disguise as government officials, and that
aliens were out to get him.4 His parents unsuccessfully tried to get him
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1. See John Gibeaut, A Matter Over Mind, 92 A.B.A. J. 32, 36 (Apr. 2006); Steve
Lash, Justices Uphold Limit on Insanity Defenses, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., June 29, 2006, at
10003.
2. See Gibeaut, supra note 1; Lash, supra note 1.
3. See Lash, supra note 1. Clark's changes occurred in stages. First, Clark became
withdrawn from friends and lost interest in sports. His parents then noticed their son
having drastic mood swings. Clark's symptoms quickly escalated as he began having
bizarre beliefs, including the belief that his parents were aliens that were going to harm
him. Lastly, Clark stopped maintaining his personal hygiene and dropped out of school.
Gibeaut, supra note 1; Lash, supra note 1.
4. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2717 (2006). Clark believed the only defense
against the aliens was to shoot them with bullets. Other bizarre behaviors he exhibited in
response to his delusions included "rig[ging] a fishing line with beads and wind chimes at
home to alert him to intrusion by invaders" and keeping a bird in his car "to warn of
airborne poison." Id.
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psychiatric help, even to the extent of having their son arrested once as a
means to have him committed.5 His parents did not give up in their efforts
and his mother actually went to her lawyer's office to try again to get Clark
civilly committed on June 20, 2000-just one day before he was arrested for
killing a police officer.6 Around five in the morning on June 21, 2000, Clark
was pulled over by Officer Jeff Moritz of the Flagstaff Police for blaring
music from his vehicle and Clark fatally shot the officer.
7
No one disputed the fact that Clark suffered from schizophrenia. 8 In
fact, Clark had to be committed to a state hospital for two years before he
was finally found competent to stand trial in 2003.9 The Supreme Court
recently affirmed Clark's first-degree murder conviction and he is currently
serving twenty-five years to life in prison.' 0 Unfortunately, Clark's story is
not uncommon. A woman in California, like Clark's parents, "begged and
pleaded with prosecutors and psychiatrists to send her son, who suffers from
5. Lash, supra note 1. Although Clark was committed, he was later released against
medical advice. Id.
6. Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 38.
7. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716; Lash, supra note 1.
8. Id. The defense argued that Clark thought Officer Moritz was an alien prepared
to harm him and, therefore, did not realize the wrongfulness of his act. The prosecution,
while agreeing that he was insane, claimed Clark knew the wrongfulness of his actions.
As proof, the prosecution looked at Clark's reported statements before the shooting that
he wanted to shoot police officers and Clark's action after the shooting of evading the
police and hiding the gun. Id. at 2716-18; see also Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Court
Upholds Moral-Incapacity Insanity Test, Limitations on Use of Mental Defect Evidence,
75 U.S.L.W. 7, 7 (July 4, 2006). Schizophrenia is a psychotic disorder that may show
itself in some of the following ways: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, or
disorganized behavior. Psychotic episodes are as real to a schizophrenic as a person
experiencing a dream. James Walker, Getting the Mentally Ill Misdemeanant Out of Jail,
6 SCHOLAR 371, 380-81 (2004). While schizophrenia is incurable, it is treatable. Mark
Heyrman, Five Things Every Lawyer Should Know About Mental Health Law, 18 CHI. B.
Ass'N REC. 31, 32 (Jan. 2004).
9. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2716.
10. Id. at 2737; Gibeaut, supra note 1.
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paranoid schizophrenia, to a mental hospital." '"1 However, like Clark, the
son was not sent into the mental health system and later landed in the
criminal justice system after he murdered a woman who came to his door
asking him to take her cat to a veterinarian.12 These are just two of many
accounts about mentally ill individuals slipping through the cracks in the
health care system and ending up in the criminal justice system, a problem
termed "the criminalization of the mentally ill.'
13
While the issues the U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed in the
case of Clark v. Arizona 14 revolved around the constitutional standards for
the insanity defense,' 5 this comment is concerned with the need and the
11. Kathleen Winchell, The Need to Close Kentucky's Revolving Door: Proposal for
a Movement Towards a Socially Responsible Approach to Treatment and Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 229 (2002).
12. Id; Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with
Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 1269, 1277 (2000).
13. Press Release, Campaign for Mental Health Reform, Mental Illness Over-
Represented in Jails & Prisons (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.mhreform.org/9-7-06-mental-
illness-over-represented-in-jails-and-prisons.html; Denise Tomasini & Karen Imas,
Collaboration Among State and Federal Agencies Benefits Mentally Ill Offenders
Reentering Society, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 2005, at 50, 52; Michael J. Stoil, Mental
Health/Justice Collaboration Receives Bare-Bones Reform, BEHAV. HEALTH MGMT.,
Jan./Feb. 2005, at 8. The term "criminalization of the mentally ill" refers to the improper
diversion of mentally ill people to the criminal justice system. James A. Gondles, The
Mentally Ill Don't Belong in Jail, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 2005, at 6. The phrase
"criminalization of the mentally ill" was first used by Marc Abrahamson to describe the
process in which mental patients eventually became inmates in the San Mateo jail. HANS
TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, THE DISTURBED VIOLENT OFFENDER 215-16 (Am.
Psychological Ass'n, rev. ed. 1994) (1989) (referring to M. F. Abrahamson, A
Comparison of Referrals by Police and Other Sources to a Psychiatric Emergency
Service, 23 HOsp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 13, 13-17 (1972)).
14. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2709, 2716.
15. Id. A divided Supreme Court (a 6-3 decision) ruled that Arizona's insanity
test-which focuses solely on whether the defendant knew his actions are right or
wrong-is constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
Court also ruled that while defendants may have witnesses describe abnormal behavior to
contest the requisite mens rea (intent) for a crime, defendants do not have a right to
permit expert witnesses to testify as to their mental condition to dispute mens rea. Id;
Lash, supra note 1.
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obligation to effectively treat severely mentally ill violent offenders,
including violent ones such as Clark, who most likely would never
encounter the criminal justice system if proper treatment was received in the
community. In addition to the legal and moral reasons to treat these people
like every other criminal defendant, there are significant practical concerns
regarding this specific class of mentally ill offenders. Simply incarcerating
this class has proven to be a disaster that results in the problem of the
"revolving door."' 16 Essentially, these individuals are not given effective
treatment in the community or during incarceration so they continually
bounce from penal institutions to hospitals due to their illness. 17 This cycle
results in people needlessly suffering from mental illnesses, a less safe
society, and wasted resources and tax dollars.'
8
This comment specifically focuses on the. Mentally Ill Offender
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act (MIOTCRA). 19 President Bush signed
the act into law in October 2004, and its purpose is "to increase public safety
by facilitating collaboration among the criminal justice, juvenile justice,
mental health treatment, and substance abuse systems. ' 'z  Congress,
realizing that simply incarcerating all mentally ill offenders is a fruitless
solution, created MIOTCRA to encourage the use of new ways to increase
awareness of mental health issues and to deal with mentally ill offenders in
the criminal justice system, such as diversion programs, enhanced treatment
in jails and prisons, and programs to assist mentally ill offenders in their
transition back in the community following their incarceration.
21
16. KELLY O'KEEFE, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE BROOKLYN MENTAL
HEALTH COURT EVALUATION 1 (2006), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/
_uploads/documents/BMHCevaluation.pdf; see also DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN,
CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING DOOR 4 (2001), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf.
17. O'KEEFE, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-414, 118 Stat. 2327 (2004).
20. Id. §3, 118 Stat. at2328.
21. Id. § 2, 118 Stat. at 2327; § 3, 118 Stat. at 2328; § 2991(b)(5)(I), 118 Stat. at
2333-34; see also DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 7; Robert Bernstein & Tammy
Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health
Courts in System Reform, 7 D.C. L. Rev. 143, 144-45 (discussing policymakers' concerns
regarding the mentally ill in the criminal justice system).
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This comment argues that MIOTCRA is flawed in offering grant
money for diversion programs, such as mental health courts, that only serve
adult and juvenile non-violent mentally ill criminal offenders.2 2 Diversion
programs place appropriate mentally ill offenders in treatment programs
rather than incarcerate them. 23 These programs have achieved extraordinary
success in treating mentally ill offenders and reducing recidivism. 24 Under
MIOTCRA, only appropriate offenders, those whose crime is deemed to be
the product of their mental illness and who are likely to succeed in the
treatment program, may be diverted from the criminal justice system.
25
Although MIOTCRA does permit grant money to be used to address
treatment for violent mentally ill offenders through in-jail or in-prison
26programs and re-entry programs, jails and prisons were not designed to be
psychiatric hospitals. Their environments can actually exacerbate mental
22. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 3(3), 118
Stat. at 2328; § 2991(a)(4)(A), 118 Stat. at 2329; § 2991(a)(9), 118 Stat. at 2330.
23. Henry J. Steadman & Michelle Naples, Assessing the Effectiveness of Jail
Diversion Programs for Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Co-Occurring
Substance Use Disorders, 23 BEHAV. Sci. L. 163, 164 (2005).
24. Ron Honberg & Darcy Gruttadaro, Flawed Mental Health Policies and the
Tragedy of Criminalization, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 2005, at 22, 24; H. Richard
Lamb, Linda E. Weinberger & Bruce H. Gross, Mentally Ill Persons in the Criminal
Justice System: Some Perspectives, 75 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 107, 117 (2004); Clair Cooper,
Court Dispenses Gentle Justice to Mentally Ill, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 15, 2006, 3,
available at http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/news/medical/v-print/story/14255524p-
15070806c.html; NATIONAL GAINS CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH CO-OCCURRING
DISORDERS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, THE NATHANIEL PROJECT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
INCARCERATION PROGRAM FOR PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS WHO HAVE
COMMITTED FELONY OFFENSES 2 (2002) [hereinafter NATHANIEL PROJECT]; Gregory L.
Acquaviva, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
971, 990-93 (2006).
25. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 2991(a)(9),
118 Stat. at 2330. The term "appropriate offender" is used in reference to MIOTCRA's
definition of "preliminary qualified offenders" for diversion programs. Id. MIOTCRA
uses the term "appropriate" in regards to cases that are eligible for diversion programs.
See id. § 3(3), 118 Stat. at 2328 & § 299 1(a)(4)(A), 118 Stat. at 2329.
26. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 §
2991(b)(5)(l)(iv), 118 Stat. at 2334.
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illnesses.27 Treatment programs in penal institutions and re-entry services
are often ineffective due to program deficiencies and challenges that arise
from the negative effects on offenders' mental illnesses from having been
kept in a jail or prison environment. 28 Just as there are appropriate and
inappropriate non-violent mentally ill offenders for diversion 
programs,29
there are appropriate and inappropriate violent mentally ill offenders for
diversion programs. Current diversion programs that accept violent
offenders have proven to be successful. 3° Not only is there no need for
MIOTCRA's limitation to non-violent offenses for diversion programs, there
are theoretical, legal, and public policy arguments for why that limitation
should be eliminated.
Allowing violent mentally ill offenders to be participate in diversion
programs would result in a safer society due to decreased recidivism rates;
less suffering for people with serious mental illnesses; financial savings
from reduced incarceration and medical fees; and greater benefits from
many mentally ill offenders becoming productive members in society.
31
Rather than deny funding to diversion programs that accept violent mentally
ill offenders, MIOTCRA should encourage and challenge policy makers to
come up with such programs given the success and benefits that can result
from them.
27. See Jennifer S. Bard, Re-Arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the
Incarceration of Individuals with Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right By Piecemeal Changes to
the Insanity Defense, 5 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2005). Bard states that,
"[p]risons were not designed to house large numbers of the mentally ill, and recent
research shows that the cramped, regimented, and punitive atmospheres of prisons
exacerbate mental illness and result in inhumane suffering." Id. See also DENCKLA &
BERMAN, supra note 16, at 1, 4.
28. Id.
29. See Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 §
2991(a)(9), 118 Stat. at 2330; § 3(3), 118 Stat. at 2328; and § 2991(a)(4)(A), 118 Stat. at
2329.
30. TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (2005),
available at http://www.psychlaws.org/BriefingPapers/BP4.pdf [hereinafter AOT]; Carol
Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental Health Court, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 587, 602 (2005).
31. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 1.
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While many jurisdictional diversion programs ban violent mentally
ill offenders, such as California's Mentally Ill Offender Criminal Reduction
32Act (MIOCR), the trend has been for more and more programs to permit at
least some violent offenders. 33 This comment focuses on federal funding
under MIOTCRA because
[t]hough the Supreme Court has chosen to leave this complex issue
[the challenges posed by mentally ill offenders] to the states, the
states look to the federal authorities for guidance. Mental illness and
its effects, both inside and outside of the criminal justice system, is a
national issue calling for a unified, organized, and coordinated
approach.
34
As mentioned in the President's New Freedom Commission on Mental
Health 2003 report, "as has long been the case in America, local innovations
under the mantle of national leadership can lead the way for successful
transformation throughout the country.
3?
Part I of this comment discusses the reason MIOTCRA was created
and its contents. Part II discusses which violent mentally ill offenders
should be allowed to participate in diversion programs funded by
MIOTCRA and also the theoretical, legal, and public policy arguments for
why they should be allowed in MIOTCRA-funded diversion programs. Part
III highlights some types of diversion programs and also discusses some that
currently accept violent mentally ill offenders.
32. 'Rosenthal' Bill, S.B. 1485, 1997-98 Leg., Reg. Sess. § l(g) (Cal. 1998). See
Merith Cosden, Jeffrey K. Ellens, Jeffrey L. Schnell, Yasmeen Yamini-Diouf & Maren
Wolfe, Evaluation of a Mental Health Treatment Court with Assertive Community
Treatment, 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 415, 417 (2003).
33. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 21, at 148; Tammy Seltzer, Mental Health
Courts: A Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System 's Unfair Treatment
of People with Mental Illness in Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L.
570, 577 (2005); Mental Health Courts, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, Aug. 1, 2006,
at 2.
34. Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is
There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibilities/Consequences Talk?,
57 ARK. L. REV. 447, 514 (2004).
35. PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE
PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 86 (2003), available at
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/toc.html [hereinafter NEW
FREEDOM].
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PART 1: THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER TREATMENT AND CRIME
REDUCTION ACT
SECTION A: The Reason for MIOTCRA-The Criminalization of the
Mentally Ill
MIOTCRA is a response to "the criminalization of the mentally
ill.,,36 People with mental illnesses are not receiving needed treatment
through the mental health system and, as a result of their mental health, are
ending up in the criminal justice system.37 The number of the mentally ill
incarcerated continues to increase and current statistics indicate that the rates
of serious mental illness are three to four times greater in jails than in the
general population. 38 The U.S. institution holding the most people with
mental illness is not a mental health institution, but rather the Los Angeles
County Jail. 39 As the numbers of mentally ill in jails and prisons have
increased over the years, the number hospitalized for mental illness has
40
sharply decreased . In 1955, 560,000 people were hospitalized with mental
illness in the U.S. compared to 80,000 in 1999.41
Some findings stated in MIOTCRA include: over 16% of adults
incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons have a mental illness; 20% of juveniles
36. See Press Release, Campaign for Mental Health Reform, Mental Illness Over-
Represented in Jail & Prisons (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.mhreform.org/9-7-
06-mental-illness-over-represented-in-jais-and-prisons.html; Tosmasini & Imas, supra
note 13, at 52; Stoil, supra note 13, at 8. The term criminalization of the mentally ill
refers to the improper diversion of many mentally ill people to the criminal justice
system. See Gondles, supra note 13, at 6.
37. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 1. The use of the term 'criminal
justice system' in this comment refers to the criminal justice system and also the juvenile
justice system.
38. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENSUS PROJECT xii (2002), available at http://consensusproject.org/downloads/
Entire report.pdf [hereinafter CSG].
39. Id. at xiii.
40. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 3 ("While the number of people with
mental illness in state psychiatric hospitals has decreased precipitously over the last thirty
years, the number of mentally-ill people in jails and prisons has steadily increased.").
41. Id.
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involved in the juvenile justice system have a serious mental illness; up to
40% of adults suffering from a serious mental illness will come in contact
with the criminal justice system at some point; the majority of those
suffering from a mental illness or emotional disorder in the criminal and
juvenile systems respond to proper treatment; and collaborative programs
between the mental health, substance abuse, and criminal or juvenile
systems can lower the amount of incarcerated mentally ill people while
improving public safety.
42
The factors that lead to the criminalization of the mentally ill are
beyond the scope of this comment. 43 However, some contributing factors
include deinstitutionalization, 44 stricter standards for civil commitment, 45 the
lack of community mental health resources, 46 funding shortages, 47 and
public policy changes such as "the get tough on crime" and anti-drug
movements. 48 Regardless of the causes, the problem of criminalizing mental
42. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-414, § 2, 118 Stat. 2327, 2327 (2004); see also DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16,
at 1.
43. The cause of the criminalization of the mentally ill is complex and not simply the
result of one or two factors. See CSG, supra note 38, at xiii; Honberg & Gruttadoro,
supra note 24, at 22. For a discussion on the causes see Lamb, Weinberger & Gross,
supra note 24, at 109-11.
44. "'Deinstitutionalization' is a term that describes the systematic shift in resources
for treating people with mental illness- from large, residential, state-run psychiatric
hospitals to community-based treatment." DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 2. The
deinstitutionalization movement started in the 1960's and lead to the mass closing of state
mental institutions. Community health service programs were supposed to take the place
of the state mental institutions in treating the mentally ill. The problem is that the
network was never effectively established, leaving many mentally ill people to be
diverted into the criminal justice system. See Dean H. Aufderheide & Patrick H. Brown,
Crisis in Corrections: The Mentally Ill in America's Prisons, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb.
2005, at 30, 31, 32.
45. See Lamb, Weinberger & Gross, supra note 24, at 110.
46. Id.
47. Thomas W. White & Elizabeth Gillespie, Mental Health Problems: Addressing
the Unfunded Mandate, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 2005, at 108.
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illness must be addressed and corrected.49 While efforts need to be made to
treat this population in the community before they become involved the
criminal justice system, for those who have already slipped through the
cracks, treatment must be given so the revolving door comes 
to halt. 50
MIOTCRA is commendable as an attempt on the federal level to address this
problem.5 1  However, as will be discussed, it falls short in forcing the
diversion programs it funds to limit their participants to only non-violent
offenders.
48. See Lamb, Weinberger & Gross, supra note 24, at 109; Maureen Buell,
Facilitating Collaboration Between Correctional and Mental Health Systems,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 2003, at 141, 141. For a discussion of the public policy
influence on the criminalization of the mentally see Alfred Blumstein, Douglas W.
Cassel, Bernadine Dohrn, Mark J. Heyrman, Randolph N. Stone & Franklin E. Zimring,
Mass Incarceration: Perspectives on U.S. Imprisonment, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
91, 91-121 (2000). Public policy changes, such as the harsher repercussions for drug
offenders and parole violators, are problematic in regards to people with mental illness
because they often abuse drugs to cope with their symptoms and lack the ability to
flawlessly conform to their parole requirements. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note
16, at 4-6.
49. See generally DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at I (discussing how in
failing to treat this class of mentally ill offenders, everyone loses because "[d]efendants
with mental illness fail to receive the help they need. The justice system fails to deploy
resources either efficiently or effectively. And the community at large fails to address a
serious public safety problem."). There are some people with mental illness who deserve
to be incarcerated. There are varying degrees of mental illness and people suffering from
a mental illness have different abilities to control their actions and abide by the law. This
comment is concerned with people with a serious mental illness and whose crimes are
considered solely the result of their mental illness and are deemed to be good candidates
for treatment programs.
50. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 4; see also Long Island Legal Briefs,
LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS, Feb. 3, 2006 [hereinafter LIBN ] (explaining that the revolving
door consists of these individuals continually cycling through the criminal justice system
because they never receive the appropriate treatment to prevent them from committing
crimes that are solely a product of their illness).
51. See Ralph M. Rivera, The Mentally Ill Offender: A Brighter Tomorrow Through
the Eyes of the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, 19 J.L.
& HEALTH 107, 110, 139 (2004-05).
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SECTION B: The Contents of the MIOTCRA
MIOTCRA is a five-year grant program that authorizes up to $50
million annually in funding for community and state programs that involve
collaboration between the mental health system and the criminal justice
systems.52 MIOTCRA grant money can be used to create or expand mental
health courts or similar courts; for specialized training for mental health
and/or criminal justice employees regarding mentally ill offenders; for
programs that support collaborative efforts between the mental health and
criminal justice systems; and for programs that support collaboration
between State and local governments regarding mentally ill offenders.
53
MIOTCRA encourages that funds be used for diversion programs
and alternative prosecution and sentencing programs such as crisis
intervention teams.54 It also promotes using funds for in-jail or in-prison
treatment and for transitional re-entry services for when mentally ill
offenders are released from jail or prison. 55  MIOTCRA stresses the
importance of having adequate support services (such as mental health,
substance abuse, housing, education, and job placement services) available
when a mentally ill offender rejoins society.
56
MIOTCRA states in its purpose that collaboration is needed to
increase sentencing alternatives for "appropriate nonviolent offenders with
mental illness;" and promote communication among various criminal justice
personnel, mental health personnel, support services personnel, and
"nonviolent offenders with mental illness or co-occurring mental illness and
substance abuse disorders."57  A "preliminary qualified offender" under
MIOTCRA must have been diagnosed at some point with a mental illness;
52. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-414, § 2991(h), 118 Stat. 2327, 2335 (2004). While this amount of money is far
from sufficient to cover the cost of reform that needs to be accomplished to tackle the
problem of the criminalization of the mentally ill, and the financial shortcomings are
crucial, the budget is beyond the scope of this article, which is concerned with the
substantive shortcomings. See Stoil, supra note 13, at 8, 10-11.
53. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 2991(b)(2).
54. Id. § 299 1(b)(5)(I)(i).
55. Id § 299 1(b)(5)(1)(iv).
56. Id. § 299 1(b)(5)(C)(ii)(VI).
57. Id. § 3(3), (6).
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have committed an offense in which its commission is deemed to be the
product of mental illness; and have committed a non-violent offense.
58 The
definition of "non-violent offense" used in MIOTCRA is
an offense that does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another or is not a felony that by its nature involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or progerty of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense.
This limit constrains all programs funded under MIOTCRA from
diverting violent mentally ill offenders.
By denying violent offenders to be considered for diversion
programs, MIOTCRA is in contradiction to its own purpose and goals.
MIOTCRA is meant to assist those that, had the health system not failed to
treat them, would never have landed in the criminal justice system in the
first place. Key components of MIOTCRA include collaboration by a
federal task force on ways to reduce recidivism with mentally ill offenders,
and a list of "best practices" used in the criminal justice system with
mentally ill offenders that must be created by the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. 61 The goals of MIOTCRA are to
62
promote health and public safety, in addition to saving government money.
Also, assuming the reasoning behind treating mentally ill offenders
differently under MIOTCRA funded diversion programs is because they lack
58. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 2991(a)(9),
118 Stat. at 2330.
59. Id. § 299 1(a)(8).
60. The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003: Hearing
on S. 1194 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter Leahy]; The
Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003: Hearing on S. 1194
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of J. Evelyn
Lundberg Stratton, Sup. Ct. of Ohio & Chair, Sup. Ct. of Ohio Advisory Committee on
Mentally Ill in the Courts) [hereinafter Stratton Testimony].
61. Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Sen. Mike DeWine) [hereinafter DeWine].
62. See id; Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 3,
118 Stat. at 2328; Leahy, supra note 60.
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the standard criminal culpability,6 3 the type of crime committed should be
irrelevant. 6 4 The distinction between offense types for diversion program
eligibility under MIOTCRA should be eliminated.
PART I1: VIOLENT MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS
While MIOTCRA is a step in the right direction and better than
nothing, it is shortsighted in offering funding to diversion programs that only
accept non-violent offenders. Considering the costs to public safety and
financial resources, this country cannot afford to ignore the treatment needs
of violent mentally ill offenders. 65  Judge Greg Mathis noted that
"[u]ntreated, mood disorders, such as bipolar disorder, can lead to violent,
and sometimes criminal, behavior." 66 He goes on to say that these people
can be rehabilitated with proper treatment. MIOTCRA should be amended
to delete the non-violent offender requirement for diversion programs to
conform with legal standards, moral standards, and the purpose and goals
stated in MIOTCRA itself.
SECTION A.- Which Violent Mentally Ill Offenders Should Be Allowed in
Diversion Programs Funded Under MIOTCRA
MIOTCRA, using the exact definition used by the Human Rights
Watch in "Ill Equipped" to define "serious mental illness," defines "mental
illness" as
a diagnosable mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder (A) of
sufficient duration to meet Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
63. This assumption comes from the requirement in MIOTCRA that to be a
"preliminary qualified offender" eligible for diversion programs, the commission of the
offense must be deemed to be "the product of the person's mental illness." Mentally Ill
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 299 1(a)(9)(B).
64. See Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How
Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L. J.
1479, 1500-01 (2005).
65. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 1; Amanda C. Pustilnik, Prisons of
the Mind: Social Values and Economic Inefficiency in the Criminal Justice Response to
Mental Illness, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 217-20, 231-39 (2005); Grachek,
supra note 64, at 1496.
66. Greg Mathis, Editorial, Justice System Must Address Mental Illness, CHI.
DEFENDER, Sept. 15, 2006, at 10.
67. Id.
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Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association
and (B)(i) that, in the case of an adult, has resulted in functional
impairment that substantially interferes with or limits 1 or more major
life activities; or (ii) that, in the case of a juvenile, has resulted in
functional impairment that substantially interferes with or limits the
juvenile's role of functioning in family, school, or community
activities.
68
The Act goes on to define a "preliminary qualified offender" as a non-
violent offender who has been diagnosed with a mental illness or who
displays obvious symptoms of mental illness, whose offense is considered
the product of his or her mental illness, and who is deemed appropriate for
diversion by a pretrial screening process or by a judge or magistrate.
69 This
definition of mental illness allows great flexibility for which mental
disorders can be targeted under MIOTCRA.
70
Mental illness, under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), includes both Axis I disorders, which are clinical
syndromes such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression,
71
and Axis 1I disorders, which are personality disorders. Many diversion
programs involving mentally ill offenders exclude people with Axis II
disorders because personality disorders are often considered harder to treat
or untreatable. 72 MIOTCRA commendably does not force programs to cut
out this population of mentally ill.
7 3
68. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 2991(a)(7).
69. Id. § 2991(a)(9).
70. MIOTCRA allows great flexibility by broadly defining "mental illness" in that it
does not limit the definition to any specific mental disorders or type of mental disorders.
71. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, xxx-xxxi, 27-28 (4th ed. text rev. 2000); see also Ronald Blackburn, "What
Works" with Mentally Disordered Offenders, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 297, 298 (2004);
Walker, supra note 8, at 381.
72. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 33 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
usal003/usal003.pdf, Blackburn, supra note 71, at 303-04.
73. As discussed, the definition of mental illness in MIOTCRA is broad and does not
expressly exclude any mental illnesses or class of mental illnesses. See Mentally Ill
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 299 1(a)(7).
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Allowing states and communities to decide if they want their
programs to include offenders with Axis 1i disorders is laudable in allowing
grant applicants to decide where they want to target their effort since there
has been no definitive proof that personality disorders are untreatable.
74
Also, the reason many programs eliminate Axis II disorders in part is due to
limited mental health personnel so additional funding from MIOTCRA may
allow these programs to expand to take into account approaches to dealing
with Axis It offenders. 5  Allowing people with Axis II disorders into
diversion programs is also important because comorbidity (a condition
including disorders from both Axis I and Axis II) is common.
76
However, while MIOTCRA confers this great discretion to
communities and states in deciding which type of mental illnesses they want
to target with diversion programs, it allows no discretion to decide to divert
violent mentally ill offenders under its funding restrictions.77  The
MIOTCRA definition for "preliminary qualified offender" introduces the
limit of non-violent offenders for diversion programs in order to be eligible
for funding.78 It should make no difference if an offense was violent or not
if a crime is determined to be the product of a mental illness, in addition to
concluding that the mental illness can most likely be managed with
treatment and/or medication because in either case the requisite mens rea is
lacking and treatment is an effective solution.
79
MIOTCRA funds should be permitted to divert a qualified offender,
regardless of offense type, who is believed to have an acceptably low risk of
recidivism upon treatment. The fact that the majority of the seriously
74. Blackburn, supra note 71, at 304
75. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 72, at 304.
76. Blackburn, supra note 71, at 298.
77. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 §
2991(a)(4)(A).
78. Id. § 299 1(a)(9).
79. See Grachek, supra note 64, at 1500-01. Criminal culpability is lacking if the
commission of the crime is deemed to be the result of a mental illness, as is required by
MIOTCRA. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 2991
(a)(9)(B). Likewise, treatment must be considered an effective solution in order to be
eligible for a diversion program under MIOTCRA. Id.
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mentally ill are incarcerated for minor misdemeanors
80 does not mean that
those who commit violent offenses should be ignored. As has been pointed
out, "[a]lthough it is important to remember that violent crimes make up
only a small percentage of insanity pleas and that many people with mental
illness are in prison for non-violent offenses, a system that does not address
the needs of violent offenders can only be a partial solution.81
The answer, therefore, to which violent mentally ill offenders should
be permitted in diversion programs funded under MIOTCRA, is those
deemed appropriate under the same decision-making processes employed to
determine appropriate non-violent mentally ill offenders for diversion.
Since MIOTCRA-funded diversion programs must consider how one's
mental illness affects his or her level of responsibility in addition to his or
her potential for rehabilitation, there is no need to enforce a limitation
based on the type of crime committed. The discretion afforded under the
current procedures used in diversion programs is appropriate to determine
which violent offenders should be included in diversion programs.
SECTION B: Why Violent Mentally Ill Offenders Should Be Allowed in
Diversion Programs Funded Under MIOTCRA
Although MIOTCRA permits grant money to be used to treat violent
mentally ill offenders while they are incarcerated or through re-entry
programs,8 3 those programs are often ineffective and inappropriate for a
violent offender who otherwise meets the MIOTCRA requirements for a• • •84
preliminary qualified offender. Since the crime must be the product of
mental illness, these violent offenders, like non-violent offenders eligible
for diversion under MIOTCRA, lack the level of responsibility that justifies
punishment. For both theoretical and legal reasons, these violent mentally ill
offenders should not serve any time in penal institutions. Additionally, the
purpose and goals stated in MIOTCRA, along with public policy
80. Bard, supra note 27, at 42.
81. Id.
82. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 § 299 1(a)(9).
83. Id. § 2991(b)(5)(I)(iv).
84. See Bard, supra note 27, at 6; Denckla & Berman, supra note 16, at 1,4.
85. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 §
2991 (a)(9)(B).
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considerations, support allowing appropriate violent mentally ill offenders to
participate in diversion programs because it would result in a healthier
society, a safer society, and conservation of government resources and
taxpayer dollars.
1. The Problem with Incarceration and Re-entry Treatment
Programs as Justifications to Exclude Violent Mentally Ill Offenders
from Diversion Programs Under MIOTCRA
While there are other options for treating violent mentally ill
offenders, such as in jail or when they transition back into the community,
there are "significant therapeutic implications" from incarcerating mentally
ill offenders. 6 Mentally ill offenders are often stigmatized and picked on
while incarcerated because they are seen as easy targets. 87 Mental illnesses
can be exacerbated from the stressful, violent, crowded and noisy conditions
in penal institutions and from the offender being isolated from friends and
family.
88
Furthermore, offenders with mental illnesses commonly have trouble
conforming their conduct to the rules and regulations in penal institutions.
89
As a result, mentally ill offenders are often punished by means including
isolation and denial from participation in various jail/prison programs while
incarcerated. 9° Making matters worse, the effects from isolation and other
punishments can aggravate mentally ill offenders' "already fragile
86. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications for Incarceration of Persons with
Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283,
285, 299 (1997); Seltzer, supra note 33, at 573; Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary:
Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 391, 391 (2006).
87. Steven C. Norton, Successfully Managing the Mentally Ill Offenders: Thoughts
and Recommendations, CORRECTIONS TODAY, 28, 29, 37 (2005).
88. Id. at 37; Fellner, supra note 86, at 391.
89. Fellner, supra note 86, at 395; Stone, supra note 86, at 299. For further
discussion on why complying with prison rules is difficult for mentally ill offenders, see
Fellner, supra note 86, at 395. Washington State found that while seriously mentally ill
offenders accounted for only 18.7% of inmates, they accounted for 41% of prison
infractions. Id. at 396.
90. Fellner, supra note 86, at 395-401. These punishments, which are supposed to
help maintain control in penal facilities, serve no deterrent purpose for mentally ill
inmates who are unable to meaningfully control their conduct. Id. at 401.
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personalities" 91 and "adverse[ly] effect . . . [their] adaptive and coping
abilities." 92  These disciplinary infractions also result in mentally ill
offenders serving longer sentences than those without mental disorders due
to the loss of accumulated "good time" and/or parole denial.93 Statistics
show that "jail inmates with mental illness stay in jail an average three to
four times longer than other inmates." 94  Thus, while a jail or prison
environment is challenging for any offender, it poses appreciably greater
risks for mentally ill offenders.95 Essentially, as argued by Human Rights
Watch, the penal system is "not only serving as a warehouse for the mentally
ill, but it is also acting as an incubator for worse illness and psychiatric
breakdowns."
96
While it is important to note that incarceration may have some
benefits, it cannot be said that the benefits outweigh the costs for seriously
mentally ill violent offenders otherwise appropriate for diversion. 97 Benefits
can come from the structure provided by penal institutions, the provision of
essentials such as shelter and food, and treatment for substance abuse and
mental health problems, if provided.98 However, while in-jail or in-prison
treatment is better than none, penal treatment programs face significant
challenges. Because mentally ill offenders often deteriorate from
incarceration, they can become even harder to treat and need even more
intense treatment or hospitalization.99  Unlike hospitals or other
environments that are conducive to reducing stress to effectively treat mental
91. Norton, supra note 87, at 37.
92. Stone, supra note 86, at 302.
93. Id. at 299; Fellner, supra note 86, at 401.
94. Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Solutions for the Mentally Ill in the Criminal
Justice System: A Symposium Introduction, 32 CAP. U. L. REv. 901, 902 (2004).
95. See Fellner, supra note 86, at 391-95; Seltzer, supra note 33, at 572-74; Stone,
supra note 86, at 285-86, 299-304.
96. Locked Up, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2003, at 32.
97. Norton, supra note 87, at 37.
98. Id.
99. Stone, supra note 86, at 299, 356.
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illnesses, jails and prisons are likely to increase stress and make effective
treatment difficult, if not impossible.
10 0
Compounding matters is the fact that many penal institutions lack
adequate personnel and services to effectively treat mentally ill offenders) °
Penal institutions were designed for the purpose of security and custody, not
to provide mental health services. 0 2 Funding is strained in trying to provide
both services in the criminal justice system. 03 However, even with proper
funding, providing effective treatment to mentally ill offenders while
incarcerated is problematic because they need an institution based on
entirely different goals, philosophies, policies, and interventions than that for
other offenders.1 4 Treatment given in jails and prisons is often for the
primary purpose of maintaining order and safety in the jail or prison itself
rather than for the long-term recovery of mentally ill inmates.' 0  Trying to
incorporate services for offenders with services for mental health is "just
another of man's attempt to square the circle."' 1 6 Judge William Wayne
Justice adequately stated the problem in the Texas case Ruiz v. Johnson:
It is deplorable and outrageous that this state's prisons appear to have
become a repository for a great number of its mentally ill citizens. Persons,
who, with psychiatry care, could fit well into society, are instead locked
away, to become wards of the state's penal system. Then, in a tragic ironic
100. See Heyrman, supra note 8, at 116.
101. Stone, supra note 86, at 285, 299-300.
102. White & Gillespie, supra note 47, at 108, 109; Brian D. Shannon, Diversion of
Offenders with Mental Illness: Recent Legislative Reforms, 59 TEX. B. J. 330, 332
(1996).
103. White & Gillespie, supra note 47, at 109. White and Gillespie label the problem
of the financial strain on the criminal justice system as the "unfunded mandate." Id.
104. John Gannon, Mental Health Corrections: The Continuing Dilemma,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 2005, at 8, 10; see also Fellner, supra note 86, at 391 ("There
is an inherent tension between the security mission of prisons and mental health
considerations.").
105. Fisler, supra note 30, at 588.
106. Gannon, supra note 104, at 10.
107. Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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twist, they may be confined in conditions that nurture, rather than abate,
their psychoses.' 
0 8
Hans Toch and Kenneth Adams, in their book "The Disturbed
Violent Offender," state that two major problems with using prisons with
mentally ill offenders are that prison routines and close cohabitation pose
problems with mentally ill behaviors. 109  Toch and Adams argue that
disturbed violent offenders must be segregated from the general prison
population to be properly treated.' 1o They advocate for a separate facility so
deviance from prison rules and routines due to mental illness can be
tolerated.' 1' It is important to note that Toch and Adams do not support all
mentally ill offenders to be admitted to such programs; they state it must be
presumed that the inmate can graduate from the program or be transferred to
another program when they transition back into society.'12 Using diversion
to get mentally ill offenders out of jails and prisons benefits those
institutions as much as the mentally ill because, as a result, jails and prisons
are easier to run in addition to being safer for staff and sane inmates.
While treatment programs in penal institutions may be acceptable for
some mentally ill offenders,' 14 MIOTCRA should not ignore that they are
improper for violent, seriously mentally ill offenders who are appropriate for
diversion. Likewise, while re-entry programs have been found to be
successful in reducing recidivism and should be advocated for mentally ill
offenders that are incarcerated, they do not justify the total exclusion of
108. Aufderheide & Brown, supra note 44, at 33.
109. TOCH & ADAMS, supra note 13, at 183.
110. Id. at 187.
ill. Id.
112. Id. at 188.
113. Id. at 223; Editorial, Decriminalizing Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2006,
§ A14, at 13. Jails and prisons are not safer because the mentally ill are dangerous per se,
rather, untreated mentally ill people may pose a significant risk of danger. Mentally ill
individuals appropriate for treatment are not more dangerous than the general population,
with proper treatment. See Shannon, supra note 102, at 332; Fisler, supra note 30, at
588.
114. For example, treatment programs in penal institutions would be acceptable for
offenders who belong there because they possessed the requisite mens rea; in other
words, their crime was not the result solely of their mental illness.
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violent mentally ill offenders from diversion programs under MIOTCRA.
115
As discussed, being incarcerated can drastically affect a mentally ill
offender's ability to be effectively treated. While re-entry programs are
better than nothing, violent mentally ill offenders who are appropriate for
diversion should be diverted rather than waiting until they are released, at
which point their condition may have greatly deteriorated, to attempt to
effectively treat them. Just like their non-violent counterparts, if these
violent mentally ill offenders are deemed to be in the criminal justice system
as a result of their mental illness and are considered likely to succeed in a
diversion program and not recidivate, then nothing should prevent or delay
their effective treatment. 
116
2. Theoretical Arguments for Diversion
There are two rationales for a therapeutic approach in dealing with
appropriate mentally ill offenders, regardless of what type of crime they
commit.'' 7 The first is that society must be protected by tending to the
mental illness that leads to the criminal act, regardless of their crime level."'
Reducing crime protects society, and to reduce recidivism with this
population of mentally ill offenders, their mental illnesses must be
effectively treated.' 19 The second underlying rationale is "to recognize that
criminal sanctions, whether intended as punishments or deterrents, are
neither effective nor morally appropriate when mental illness is a significant
cause of the criminal act." 120 Based on these two underlying principles,
115. See Vanessa St. Gerard, State News, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 2004, at 14, 14.
A re-entry program for mentally ill offenders in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania has reduced
recidivism to 9.9% and costs only $3000 a person compared to the national average of
$25,000 annually for a prison inmate. A Utah re-entry program reduced recidivism rates
by 9% in an eighteen-month period, saving taxpayers approximately five million dollars.
Id.
116. Id.
117. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 21, at 148.
118. Id.
119. See Bard, supra note 27, at 13, 21. To support her argument that mental illness
must be treated to reduce crime, Bard uses a graph prepared by NAMI, which shows an
inverse relationship between the amount of people committed to mental institutions in the
early 1960's and the amount of people with mental illness in prison currently. Id.
120. See Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 21, at 148.
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MIOTCRA should permit the diversion programs it funds to include violent
mentally ill offenders.
The four traditional justifications for punishment are deterrence,
retribution, rehabilitation, and confinement.' 21  Under these justifications,
there is no reason to exclude offenders from diversion programs based on
whether a crime was violent or non-violent. The purpose of deterrence,
whether general or specific, is not being served in excluding all violent
mentally ill offenders from diversion programs since the mental illness, and
not free choice, must be the underlying cause of a crime to be eligible for
any diversion program funded under MIOTCRA.122  Someone with
schizophrenia, like Clark, who suffers from delusions that they must protect
themselves from imminent lethal attack due to their mental illness, will not
be deterred from the consequences of breaking the law no matter how
severe.123
Likewise, it cannot be said that retribution is being served by
punishing someone for a crime attributable to a medical problem and not
free choice. Seriously mentally ill offenders, including violent ones, do not
possess the same level of culpability as average criminals due to their
"reduced capacity to process information and adapt their conduct to social
expectations and norms."'1 2 4 If a treatable, violent mentally ill offender was
not aware of his or her act so as to be truly responsible for his or her actions,
retribution is not being properly served by incarcerating them. 12  If an
offense is considered a product of mental illness, the mentally ill offender
can be viewed as a victim of his or her disease in the commission of the
offense. 126 Also, since diversion programs established under MIOTCRA are
121. Bard, supra note 27, at 61-62.
122. See id. at 62, 66.
123. See Byers, supra note 34, at 467 (discussing how Daniel M'Naghten fell under
this category of psychotic delusions and killed another claiming self-defense because he
thought that government officials were conspiring against him due to his delusions).
124. Id. at 502.
125. Bard, supra note 27, at 68-69.
126. See Acquaviva, supra note 24, at 985-86 (quoting Associate Judge Lawrence P.
Fox, of Cook County, Illinois, Mental Health Court, when describing the Mental Health
Court model, "It's innovative and appropriate for criminal justice to recognize we have a
lot of people in jail more because of their mental illness than their criminality .... They
need treatment more than they need to be in jail, more than they need to be punished.").
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designed to address the cracks in the health system, appropriate offenders,
whether non-violent or violent, can also be seen as victims of the mental
health system that failed to treat them before they fell into the criminal
justice system.
127
By locking up violent mentally ill offenders without ensuring they
receive effective health treatment, rehabilitation is not being furthered.
More commonly, rather than receiving rehabilitative treatment, these• . .128
individuals are abused by others while incarcerated. Even if some
treatment is provided while incarcerated, mentally ill offenders may be even
worse off than prior to their incarceration due to their condition deteriorating
in a prison or jail environment.129 As stated by Jamie Fellner, the director of
the U.S. Program of Human Rights Watch: "Placing the mentally ill in a
brutal environment that they are not equipped to navigate without the aid of
robust mental health services promotes neither rehabilitation nor prison
security. It smacks more of cruelty than justice. '
Lastly, excluding the violent mentally ill from diversion programs
funded under MIOTCRA does not further the goal of confinement. The
reason behind confinement is safety, not punishment. 131 If a mentally ill
offender can be effectively diverted, there is no need for confinement. As
discussed, even if treatment is given in jail and prison, it is often ineffective
due to deficiencies in the program and/or the destructive jail or prison
environment. Removing a treatable violent mentally ill offender from
society without ensuring adequate treatment cannot be said to truly preserve
safety in proper balance with individuals' right to liberty for the purpose of
confinement. 132
127. See Treatment Advocacy Center, http://psychlaws.blogspot.com/
2006 08 01_archive.html (Aug. 23, 2006; 09:29 EST) (last visited Nov. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter Advocates].
128. Gracheck, supra note 64, at 1489.
129. See Bard, supra note 27, at 6; DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 1. 4.
130. Fellner, supra note 86, at 412.
131. Bard, supra note 27, at 68.
132. See id. at 67-68 (because of strong liberty interests, Bard discusses how overuse
of institutionalization in the context of civil commitment led to a deinstitutionalization
movement in the context of civil commitment. In footnote 347, Bard refers to the fact
that merely placing criminals in jails does not always lead to a safer society because
"imprisonment, with its resulting concentration of law breakers and its permanent stigma,
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3. Legal Arguments for Diversion
Our justice system recognizes varying levels of responsibility based
on mental capacity, regardless of whether a crime was violent or non-
violent. Children are considered to lack the mental facilities to be fully
responsible for their actions.' 33 Likewise, the Supreme Court held in Atkins
v. Virginia134 that it is unconstitutional to execute mentally retarded
offenders due to the lack of proportionality between their culpability and the
punishment.'3 5 The insanity defense, guilty but mentally ill verdict, mens
rea standards, and similar legal devices all take into account mental capacity
regardless of offense level. 116 Based on this principle of responsibility and
culpability, MIOTCRA should not ban violent mentally ill offenders from
diversion programs. By only addressing non-violent offenders in regards to
diversion programs, MIOTCRA unfortunately "leaves the foundation issue
of culpability unacknowledged and unaddressed."' 37
increases rather than decreases crime." (citing GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:
IDEAS, VALUES, DEBATES 90-91 (2002)). Bard says "other elements of punishment" must
be considered in addition to the "remov[al] of criminals from society." Extending her
analysis to the criminalization of the mentally ill, merely locking this class up without
proper treatment will not lead to a safer society. When these individuals are eventually
released, their illness will likely be worse from being incarcerated and they will likely
recidivate and continue the cycle of the revolving door). See Stone, supra 86, at 356-57.
It is important to note that in stating that none of the traditional reasons for punishment
justifies MIOTCRA's exclusion of all violent mentally ill offenders from diversion
programs, it does not refer to all mentally ill offenders but only those that qualify
otherwise as preliminary offenders under MIOTCRA. As mentioned, for a mentally ill
offender to be eligible for anything funded by MIOTCRA, the crime must be deemed
solely the result of a mental illness and the offender must be considered an appropriate
candidate for treatment. Those mentally ill offenders that do not meet that requirement
may deserve to be excluded due to one or more of the traditional reasons for punishment.
133. Bard, supra note 27, at 22.
134. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
135. Bard, supra note 27, at 22; see Byers, supra note 34, at 506-07.
136. See Bard, supra note 27, at 28-42 (discussing the various types of insanity
defenses along with mental health courts). Bard notes that the problem of mental health
courts, unlike the types of insanity defenses, is that is does not address violent offenders.
Id. at 42.
137. Byers, supra note 34, at 518.
2007] Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act
Although the law's treatment of mental illness is complicated due to
the lack of a universal consensus on how much brain impairment from
mental illness is enough to excuse serious criminal behavior, 138 that reason
does not justify automatically treating all mentally ill violent offenders like a
standard criminal defendant. While the insanity defense and similar legal
channels were designed to take mental illness into account, they often fail to
adequately protect many mentally ill offenders, such as Clark. With no
other options such as diversion available, these mentally ill offenders, whose
crime was the sole result of a treatable mental illness that the health system
failed to adequately address, are unfairly treated as having the same
responsibility level as a nonmentally ill offender.
While the Supreme Court should employ the Atkins culpability
principle as the basis for its decisions regarding the medical treatment of
mentally ill offenders, it has instead used the Ei hth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." 1  However, even
under the Eighth Amendment's framework, the automatic exclusion of
violent mentally ill offenders from the diversion programs under MIOTCRA
should be eliminated. Penal regulations and prison officials' conduct violate
the Eighth Amendment if it causes "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain"' or if it is incompatible with "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."'142 By automatically denying all
violent mentally ill offenders access to diversion programs, MIOTCRA is
violating the Eighth Amendment in both regards.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in the 1976 case of Estelle v.
Gamble143 that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment forbids jails and prisons from being deliberately indifferent "to
138. See Bard, supra note 27, at 22-28.
139. Id. at 5, 43, 72.
140. Byers, supra note 34, at 506-07. Byers states that while the Supreme Court has
not based its decision regarding the treatment of mentally ill offenders on the
proportionality principle, the lower courts may do so based on Atkins v. Virginia. Id. at
525. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
141. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976)).
142. Stone supra note 86, at 322-23; see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-04.
143. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
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serious needs of inmates of prisoners with severe mental disorders,"'
44
regardless of whether they committed a violent or non-violent offense.145 If
incarceration prevents effective treatment from being given to violent
mentally ill offenders where diversion programs are used for similarly
situated non-violent offenders, incarceration in those cases would be the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."' 46
It is important to note that Estelle v. Gamble involved a prisoner's
physical back problem and the Supreme Court has never expressly extended
the right to treatment under Estelle to mental health care, although some
argue that the decision directly incorporates the right to such treatment.
147
Various jurisdictions have interpreted the ruling in Estelle to include the
right to treatment for mental illnesses, such as in the Fourth Circuit Court of
144. Stone, supra note 86, at 357.
145. The Court stated that under the Eighth Amendment,
[t]hese elementary principles establish government's obligation to
provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.
An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if
the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In the worst
cases, such failure may actually produce physical "torture or a
lingering death".... In less serious cases, denial of medical care may
result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (citation omitted). This sets the high standard of deliberate
indifference for entitlement to medical treatment. Mere negligence, substandard care or
malpractice is not enough to satisfy the requirement of deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's medical need. See Fellner, supra note 86, at 405. However, mentally ill
inmates, such as the one in an Illinois prison who hears voices of dead people, attempts to
eat his own flesh and cuts his legs and arms in order to relax, or the prisoner in an Indiana
prison who constantly picks into his ears in an attempt to get the radio he believes is
located in his nerves, have strong arguments that there was deliberate indifference to their
medical needs in not providing them with proper treatment. See Locked Up, supra note
96, at 32.
146. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)).
147. Thomas Hafemeister & John Petrila, Treating The Mentally Disordered
Offender: Society's Uncertain, Conflicted, And Changing Views, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
731, 769 (1994); see also Aufderheide & Brown, supra note 44, at 32 (stating that Estelle
v. Gamble "clearly determined that the Eight Amendment requires that prison officials
provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care, including mental health
care.").
2007] Mentally III Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act 95
Appeals' opinion in Bowring v. Godwin 14 8 and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion in Doty v. County of Lassen.149  Considering these
holdings, in addition to the medical and psychological advances made since
Estelle was decided in 1976 and that the Eighth Amendment must be
considered in light of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society," 150 it should be inferred that the Eighth
Amendment right to treatment includes the right to mental health treatment.
Bowring v. Godwin specifically held that mental health care falls
under the Eighth Amendment's right to medical treatment for prisoners.
15 1
The Bowring court stated that there is "no underlying distinction between the
right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological or psychiatric
counterpart." It established a three-part test to determine when a prisoner
has an Eighth Amendment right to psychological or psychiatric care: "(1)
that the prisoner's symptoms evidence serious disease or injury; (2) that the
disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that
the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care
would be substantial."' 153 The opinion in Bowring also stated that such
deprivation of treatment would also be a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause violation since it could result in deprivation of life.
54
Doty v. County of Lassen, also holding that inmates have a right to
mental health treatment, said that an inmate "must show deliberate
indifference to a 'serious' medical condition. ' 5 5 It said a serious medical
condition is more than just the general discomforts that come from being
148. Bowing v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
149. Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1994); see Bard, supra note
27, at 20; Stone, supra note 86, at 324.
150. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
151. Bowing, 551 F.2d at 47-48.
152. Id. at 47; see Bard, supra note 27, at 20 n.67.
153. Bowing, 551 F.2d at 47.
154. Id.
155. Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 947 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.
1992)); see Stone, supra note 86, at 325.
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incarcerated.156 A serious medical need was defined as when an offender
had "an injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and worthy of
comment and treatment, . . . the presence of a medical condition that
significantly affects an individual's daily activities, and ... the existence of
chronic or substantial pain."
157
The more recent case of Madrid v. Gomez158 held that the conditions
at Pelican Bay Prison in California were in violation of the Eighth
Amendment because they were "grossly deficient"' 59 for lack of adequate
mental health facilities and staffing. 60 Thus, an Eighth Amendment
violation occurs if prison conditions exacerbate serious mental illness and
prison officials know the conditions will result in a deterioration of mental
illness.' 61 As discussed, even when treatment is offered in jail or prison, it is
often ineffective and unable to prevent mental illnesses from worsening,
particularly when compared to diversion programs if they are available.
Therefore, in order to provide effective treatment and avoid potential Eighth
Amendment challenges, MIOTCRA should not automatically exclude all
violent mentally ill offenders from being eligible for diversion programs.
While it is understandable that "releasing low-level offenders to
treatment is easier to build consensus around, politically safer, and less
likely to lead to outraged headlines if a program participant re-offends,"'
162
that does not excuse Congress from ignoring violent mentally ill offenders'
constitutional rights. If Congress will not act, then the courts should step in
because although
[m]ental illness and crime are political issues, with potential political
solutions ... if the popular will is too weak for the job, then it falls to
the judicial branch to rescue the seriously ill offender and his fate
156. Doty, 37 F.3d at 546; see Stone, supra note 86, at 326.
157. Doty, 37 F.3d at 546 n.3 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60); see Stone,
supra note 86, at 326.
158. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1279-80 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
159. Id. at 1222.
160. Id.; see Stone, supra note 86, at 327.
161. Stone, supra note 86, at 327.
162. NATHANIEL PROJECT, supra note 24, at 1.
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from "the vicissitudes of political controversy" and to establish basic
tenets of decency "as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
' 163
In addition to the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, MIOTCRA
should not limit diversion programs to only serving non-violent mentally ill
offenders under international human rights law, which requires treatable
mentally ill offenders receive effective treatment. 16 4 The United States is a
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 16 5
Pertinent provisions of the treaty include that the goal of the penal system is
for inmates' "reformation and social rehabilitation,"'166 and that inmates have
a right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment. 167 Since "imprisonment by its very nature has an adverse effect
on mental health," as pointed out by the World Health Organization,
diversion should be advocated for all appropriate mentally ill offenders,
regardless of whether an offense is violent.'
68
4. Policy Arguments for Diversion
While Congress should eliminate the MIOTCRA violent offender
limit under the legal principles of criminal responsibility and the protection
from cruel and unusual punishment, there are additionally public policy
169
rationales for which it should do so. Suitably stated, "[t]he most
important point we must make here is that constitutional minima in this (or
any other) area must not be confused with desirable governmental policy,
163. Byers, supra note 34, at 537 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
164. Fellner, supra note 86, at 391, 405, 412 ("The failure of U.S. prisons to address
adequately the special needs of prisoners with serious mental illness ... flies in the face
of international human rights standards."). Whereas diversion programs are designed to
ensure severely mentally ill offenders receive proper treatment, Fellner points out, "U.S.
prisons are not designed or equipped for mentally ill offenders." Id. at 391.
165. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; see Fellner, supra note 86, at 407.
166. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 165, at art. 10.
167. Id. at art. 7; see Fellner, supra note 86, at 407.
168. Fellner, supra note 86, at 411 (referring to WORLD HEALTH ORG., INFORMATION
SHEET: MENTAL HEALTH AND PRISONS 1 (2005), available at http://www.euro.who.int
DocumentIMNHIWHOICRCInfoSht MNHPrisons.pdf.).
169. See Stone, supra note 86, at 340.
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desirable professional practices or standards, or desirable penal practices or
standards. 170  Policy-based reasons why Congress should eliminate the
violent offender diversion restriction in MIOTCRA include that mental
health will be improved, society will be better protected, and governmental
resources and taxpayer dollars will be conserved.
17 1
Without the benefit of the diversion programs, mentally ill offenders
are often left with the insanity defense as their only way to get the treatment
they truly need.172 When the insanity defense is either nonexistent or fails in
a case of a mentally ill offender, the potential options of a mens rea standard
of guilt or a guilty but mentally ill verdict do not ensure a mentally ill
offender will receive proper treatment. 173 For example, Steve DeRoss, the
Sacramento County assistant chief probation officer, stated that without
proper treatment and medication, the mentally ill are "in and out of the
system, in and out of where they're living and jail, (which) generally
exacerbates the problem." 74
As discussed, while efforts have been made to try and treat these
individuals while they are incarcerated, programs are often deficient and all
too often the inmates' mental health deteriorates, rather than improves.
Mental health courts and other diversion programs should therefore be
encouraged under MIOTCRA for appropriate violent mentally ill offenders,
who may be the most in need of treatment and the ones who society will
benefit the most by treating. It has been noted that "the most appropriate
target of treatment among mentally disordered offenders is the mental
disorder, and that by treating the mental disorder, the likelihood of criminal
recidivism will thereby be reduced., 175  Compared to 28% of federal
170. TOCH & ADAMS, supra note 13, at 185 (quoting Fred Cohen, Legal Issues and
the Mentally Disordered Offender, in SOURCEBOOK ON THE MENTALLY DISORDERED
PRISONER 33, 33 (Nat'l Inst. of Corr. ed., 1985)).
171. Pustilnik, supra note 65, at 218.
172. As discussed throughout this article, treatment in jails and prisons are often
ineffective. See Bard, supra note 27. Thus, the only way to receive proper treatment is
in a mental health facility, not a penal institution. Without eligibility for diversion
programs, the only hope for being sent to a treatment facility rather than a penal
institution is through the insanity defense.
173. Bard, supra note 27, at 36-40; DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 6.
174. Cooper, supra note 24, at 3.
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prisoners without mental illnesses, 49% of federal prisoners with mental
illnesses have three or more prior probations, incarcerations, 
or arrests.17 6
MIOTCRA goes against its own goals of improving mental health care and
promoting a safer society by excluding appropriate violent mentally ill
offenders from diversion programs, where they would likely receive the
necessary treatment to successfully manage their illness and stay out of the
criminal justice system.
The purpose of MIOTCRA is for states and communities to
experiment and collaborate to find the best solutions to deal with mentally ill
offenders. 77  It is important to note that while there is an association
between violence with mental illnesses, people with mental illnesses are
estimated to be responsible for no more than 10% of serious violent episodes
in the U.S. and "strangers constitute only a small minority of the victims of
violence committed by those with psychosis. '' i 78 A National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill and Public Citizen's Health Research Group survey suggests
that for those rare cases when mentally ill individuals commit serious
crimes, frequently the offenders' mental illness(es) were not 
treated.' 79
When appropriate mentally ill offenders are given effective treatment, they
are no more dangerous than the general population; it is simply lack of
treatment that makes them dangerous. 18 Thus, there is no basis to the belief
that people with mental illnesses are inherently dangerous. Rather, there is
plenty of support for the position that appropriate violent mentally ill
offenders, like their non-violent counterparts, can succeed in diversion
programs to manage their illness and conform to the law.'
81
175. Marie E. Rice, Grant T. Harris & Vernon L. Quinsey, Treatment for Forensic
Patients, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW 141, 142 (Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds.,
1996).
176. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 4.
177. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, § 3, 118 Stat.
at 2328; § 2991(b)(2)(D), 118 Stat. at 2330; § 2991(b)(5)(G)(i), 118 Stat. at 2333; §
2991(f).
178. Rice, Harris & Quinsey, supra note 175, at 142; Elizabeth Walsh & Thomas
Fahy, Violence in Society: Contribution of Mental Illness is Low, 325 BMJ 507, 508
(2002).
179. Shannon, supra note 102, at 332.
180. Id.; Seltzer, supra note 33, at 584.
181. Rice, Harris & Quinsey, supra note 175, at 142.
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Although there is a need for more research showing that treatment
results in reduced recidivism, both in regards to violent and non-violent
mentally ill offenders, "there are data that indicate promise for training in
moral reasoning, academic programs, and rovision of prosocial models who
model anticriminal values and attitudes."1 2 Studies conducted with violent
mentally ill offenders support the conclusion that while severe mental
illnesses such as schizophrenia are associated with violence, medication
compliance and awareness of one's mental illness are key predictors to
violence for this population. 183 One study found that enhanced treatment
compliance for psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia was the most
significant factor in achieving positive clinical and social outcomes, which
included reduced violence. 184 A 1998 MacArthur Foundation study found a
50% reduction in rate of violence for people treated for their serious brain
disorders. 185 A briefing paper by the Treatment Advocacy Center (TAC)
states that when severely mentally ill people take their medications, they are
no more dangerous than the general population; whereas, when they are not
taking their medication, they are more dangerous than the general
population.
186
The TAC briefing paper cited one study that found an inverse
correlation between schizophrenics' propensity to violence and their blood
level of antipsychotic medication, while another study cited found a
correlation between severely mentally ill patients' failure to take medication
and their history of violent acts in the community. 8 7 The briefing paper also
182. Id. at 165.
183. TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: ONE OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO TREAT INDIVIDUALS WITH SEVERE PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS
(2003), available at http://www.psychlaws.org/BriefingPapers/BP8.htm [hereinafter
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR]. It is also important to note that the risk for violence is greatly
increased when mentally illness coexists with a substance abuse problem, which is
common because people suffering from mental illnesses often use drugs and/or alcohol to
soothe their symptoms. Id.
184. Blackburn, supra note 71, at 300-01.
185. TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, FACT SHEET: CONSEQUENCES OF NON-
TREATMENT, available at http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/Factl.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2007).
186. VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, supra note 183.
187. Id. at 2.
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discussed a study finding that rather than schizophrenia itself, inadequately
treated symptoms of delusions and hallucinations predicted violent
behavior. 188 That study found that 71% of violent schizophrenics had
medication compliance problems compared to only 17% of those without
hostile behaviors. 189 An additional study mentioned found more than 75%
of schizophrenics offended due to delusions and concluded that treating this
population is just as important for public safety as it is for personal health
190
reasons.
Like non-violent seriously mentally ill offenders, the crimes of
violent mentally ill offenders are often the product of a treatable illness
rather than criminality.191 When that is the case and effective treatment is
provided, violent offenders do not pose any greater risk of danger than non-
violent offenders.1 2 Therefore, a violent mentally ill offender, whose crime
is considered solely the result of a manageable mental illness such as
schizophrenia, should not be automatically denied opportunities for effective
treatment in diversion programs funded by MIOTCRA.
Lastly, government resources and tax dollars can be more efficiently
utilized by allowing appropriate violent mentally ill offenders to be diverted.
Mentally ill offenders spend more time incarcerated and use a significant
amount of crisis intervention resources.1 93 Often, this class of offenders has
to be transferred to higher security prisons due to their irrational behavior,
which ends up costing more than providing mental health care.194
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 4.
191. There is evidence supporting the belief that violent acts committed by psychotic
offenders are directly attributable to the psychotic disorder. Id. See also B. G. Link, H.
Andrews & F. T. Cullen, Reconsidering the Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental
Patients, 57 AM. Soc. REV. 275 (1992). Research conducted by Link et al. found that
people in the general population who report feeling psychotic symptoms are more likely
to report they recently engaged in violent behavior.
192. Shannon, supra note 102, at 332.
193. Stratton, supra note 94, at 902-03.
194. GREG JONES & MICHAEL CONNELLY, STATE COMM'N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING
POL'Y, MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE ISSUES (Feb. 2002),
available at http://www.msccsp.org/publications/mental.html.
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Additional indirect costs include the "lost productivity from untreated or
undertreated mental illness and from incarceration.",195 Justice Evelyn
Lundberg Stratton, a justice for the Supreme Court of Ohio and the chair of
the Supreme Court of Ohio Advisory Committee on Mentally III in the
Courts, states additional costs associated with the problem of the revolving
door are "paying for police officers to repeatedly arrest, transport, and
process mentally ill defendants, as well as for jail costs associated with
treatment and crisis intervention, salaries for judges and court staff,
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and many more hidden costs."' 96 While
the extra costs would be justified if they produced a benefit in deterrence or
public safety, that is not the case.'
97
In addition to costing more, by incarcerating violent mentally ill
offenders appropriate for diversion, penal officials are being distracted from
their primary mission of providing security.' 98 Prisons are being forced to
be de facto mental hospitals and deal with problems that should be handled
and addressed in the mental health system. These offenders take up needed
space in jails and prisons while straining the limited mental health resources
available in the penal system. 199 Thus, it is important for diversion programs
to reach out to any appropriate mentally ill offenders, regardless of what
type of crime they committed since "[r]esponding to problems of mental
illness principally through the criminal justice system imposes billions of
dollars annually on the public, above any offsetting benefit in public safety
and deterrence, and imposes terrible human costs on people who suffer from
these illnesses."
200
The reasons why violent mentally offenders should be permitted in
diversion programs under MIOTCRA go right to the heart of why
MIOTCRA was created. MIOTCRA was developed to address the mentally
195. Pustilnik, supra note 65, at 219. Pustilnik also notes that there is an indirect cost
due to "the lost productivity of the family members or other intimates who provide
unpaid care for a person with a mental illness." Id.
196. Stratton, supra note 94, at 902-03.
197. Pustilnik, supra note 65, at 219.
198. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 2 1, at 161.
199. Stone, supra note 86, at 357.
200. Pustilnik, supra note 65, at 218. Pustilnik cites a list of federal and state task
forces and committees that have noted these costs. Id.
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201
ill population who slipped through the cracks of the health care system.
MIOTCRA was idealized as a way to provide care for mentally ill offenders
who have treatable mental disorders and would not have landed in the
202
criminal justice system but for their disorder. MIOTCRA was developed
to stop the "revolving door" and ensure that this population was getting the
necessary treatment to stay out of the criminal justice system, resulting in a
safer society and appropriate resource allocation. 203 For those very reasons,
MIOTCRA should not force the diversion programs it funds to exclude
violent mentally ill offenders from consideration for care.
PART III: WAYS MIOTCRA FUNDS CAN, AND SHOULD, BE USED TO
DIVERT VIOLENT MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS
While the Supreme Court lets state courts struggle to balance humane
treatment of mentally ill offenders with public safety, some argue that there
should be a unified and standardized approach to handling mental illness in
204the criminal justice system. While treatment of mentally ill offenders is
so diverse and much more empirical research is still needed, states should be
allowed to experiment and focus on various solutions to handle mentally ill
offenders. Effort must be made to see that mentally ill violent offenders,
like non-violent ones, receive the mental health treatment they need to stop
cycling into the criminal justice system.
20
5
Diversion programs, such as mental health courts ("MHCs") and
outpatient treatment programs, have proven to be highly successful in cost-
effectively treating mentally ill offenders, reducing recidivism, and reducing
violence. 206 As such, federal funding under MIOTCRA should not prevent
states and communities from allowing violent mentally ill offenders to
participate in diversion programs. Just as Dr. Sally Satel criticized President
Bush's New Freedom Commission on Mental Health for failing to address
the "hard-to-treat" group of mentally ill offenders and remarked that "severe
201. DeWine, supra note 61.
202. Id.; Stratton Testimony, supra note 60.
203. DeWine, supra note 61; Leahy, supra note 60.
204. See Hafemeister & Petrila, supra note 147, at 869; Byers, supra note 34, at 514.
205. Solana Pyne, Mental Health Court: A Different Kind of Justice, Pt. 1, NY I
NEWS, May 31, 2006, available at http://www.nyt.com/nyI/content/
index.jsp?&aid=59853&search result
= I &stid=6.
206. AOT, supra note 30.
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and persistent illness is a factor in 10-15[%] of violent crimes," MIOTCRA
deserves to be criticized for not allowing the hard-to-treat group of violent
mentally ill offenders to be permitted in diversion programs.
SECTION A: Mental Health Courts
MIOTCRA encourages that funding be used to establish more
208MHCs. Prior to MIOTCRA, the America's Law Enforcement and Mental
Health Project Act, which was signed into law on November 13, 2000 by
President Bill Clinton, granted federal funds for the development or
209expansion of MHCs. MHCs are a method to divert mentally ill offenders
from jail or prison to get them the necessary treatment so they can conform
to the laws. 21 Most judges are unfamiliar with the mental health system and
lack the ability to adequately access mentally ill offenders or know what
options are available to effectively assist them.211 Specialized mental health
courts address this problem and involve personnel with the knowledge and
training to appropriately sentence suitable defendants to treatment rather
than incarceration. 2 12 The goal is to reduce recidivism by addressing the
207. Byers, supra note 34, at 516-17.
208. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-414, § 2991(b)(2)(A), 118 Stat. 2327, 2330 (2004).
209. America's Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project Act § 3(a), 42 U.S.C. §
3796ii (2000); Acquaviva, supra note 24, at 988-89.
210. Advocates, supra note 127. MHCs were developed based on the success of drug
courts. There are now several types of specialized "problem-solving courts" in addition
to drug courts and mental health courts, which include community courts, domestic
violence courts, and re-entry courts. Rather than focus on punishment for the crime
committed, these courts focus on the root problem that lead to the criminal act, in order to
reduce the likelihood of future criminal acts. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 7.
A definition given for mental health courts is that they "1) are criminal courts, 2) have
separate dockets exclusive to persons with mental illness, 3) divert defendants from jail
and/or prison into community-based mental health treatment, and 4) judicially monitor
mental health treatment and potentially impose sanctions for non-compliance." O'KEEFE,
supra note 16, at 2 (citing Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their Promise
and Unanswered Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457, 457-58 (2001)).
211. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 1.
212. Id. at 7.
2007] Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act
root of the problem-the mental illness-for which these people wind up in
court.2 13
The first MHC was opened in 1997 in Broward County, Florida and
since mid-2006 over 100 have opened in the United States.2 14 Depending on
the jurisdiction, the point at which defendants are identified as suitable
candidates for MHC varies.2 15 Most MHCs use a deferred prosecution or
216deferred sentencing model. Participation in an MHC is voluntary and the
length of judicial supervision and treatment varies depending on each
defendant's individual needs. 217  However, most MHCs have a one-year
minimum treatment period to ensure defendants receive adequate treatment
so as to prevent recidivism.2 18 Treatment can involve any combination of
services such as outpatient treatment, case management, or highly structured
21924-hour care. Judicial monitoring is employed to ensure compliance with
the program and to access the progress of the treatment.
22 °
Most MHCs currently allow only offenders with non-violent,
misdemeanor charges diagnosed with Axis I disorders. 22  However, since
2001, some have started to allow violent felony offenders, such as the
213. Id.
214. Acquaviva, supra note 24, at 983; Mental Health Courts, supra note 33, at 4; Ari
Shapiro, All Things Considered, States Try Out Courts Tailored for Mentally Ill, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO, Aug. 21, 2006, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=5685265.
215. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 9.
216. Honberg & Gruttadaro, supra note 24, at 24.
217. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 8, 10.
218. Id. at 10.
219. Lamb et al., supra note 24, at 122.
220. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 10. An important feature of MHCs is
that they maintain jurisdiction over the mentally ill offender while in treatment.
Therefore, compliance with the program is ensured but, if the person fails to comply, the
participant can face consequences including revocation of the grant to participate in the
treatment program followed by standard criminal sentencing. See Bernstein & Seltzer,
supra note 21, at 156-58.
221. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 9.
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Brooklyn MHC. 222 Unlike drug courts, which rush to place offenders in
treatment programs, MHCs are precautionary and have a lengthy assessment
and intake process to ensure only appropriate participants are accepted and
that a suitable individualized treatment plan is developed prior to release
223from custody. Just as MIOTCRA permits the diversion programs funded
under it to include mentally ill offenders with Axis II disorders, even though
the majority of MHCs accept participants with only Axis I disorders, it
should permit those programs the option to divert violent mentally ill
offenders.
Studies have found MHCs to be highly effective and cheaper than
other options in dealing with mentally ill offenders.2 24 In particular, MHCs
have been found to be effective in reducing recidivism, including violent
offenses. 225 A Broward County, Florida study found that from October 2001
to September 2002 only 27% of MHC participants were rearrested and that
226
none of the first 675 participants have since committed a violent offense.
While the participants in the Broward County MHC were all non-violent
misdemeanor offenders, a King County, Washington study involved
222. Mental Health Courts, supra note 33, at 5; Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 21, at
149; Seltzer, supra note 33, at 578. Of the 20 oldest MHCs studied by the Judge David
L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, only half accepted participants with
misdemeanor charges and half accepted some participants with felony charges under
certain circumstances. A more recent survey showed that 56.5% of sixty-nine MHCs
accepted participants charged with felonies. Seltzer, supra note 33, at 577.
223. Fisler, supra note 30, at 592.
224. Shapiro, supra note 214; Henry J. Steadman & Michelle Naples, supra note 23;
Editorial, Divert Mentally Ill Offenders, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 10, 2006, at 6B
[hereinafter ENQUIRER]; Cooper, supra note 24. For studies listing successful statistics of
MHC programs, see Acquaviva, supra note 24, at 990-93.
225. Acquaviva, supra note 24, at 990 (discussing studies conducted on both violent
and non-violent recidivism in the "Mental Health Court Effectiveness" section); Lamb et
al., supra note 24, at 113; Cooper, supra note 24, at 2; NATHANIEL PROJECT, supra note
24, at 4.
226. Acquaviva, supra note 24, at 990-91 (citing Jenni Bergal, Justice That Works;
Mentally Ill Defendants Avoid the Revolving Door of Jail, Get Their Lives Back on Track
Through Mental Health Court's Assistance, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov.
24, 2002, at IA; LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health
Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28
AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 257 (2001)).
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offenders with violent criminal activity and found that for MHC participants,
violent criminal activity was reduced by 88%.227 In addition, that study
found that 75% of the participants did not commit any offenses one year
after their graduation from the MHC program. 228 A Hamilton County, Ohio
MHC has also successfully reduced recidivism in cutting re-offender rates to
less than 10%.229
230MHCs have also been a financial success. The daily cost of the
mental health court in Ohio is only $30; the daily cost in prison is $60, the
daily cost in a mental hospital is $451, and the daily cost in a general
hospital is $1500.231 In addition to costing less to administer, money is
saved by the decreased arrest rates and hospital time associated with
offenders processed through MHCs. 232  The Santa Clara MHC saves
approximately $600,000 yearly in jail space. 233 Its first 900 or so graduates
227. Id. at 991 (citing JOHN R. NEISWENDER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF
OUTCOMES FOR KING COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT 6 (2004), available at
http://www.metrokc.gov/KCDC/mhcsum32.pdf).
228. Id.
229. ENQUIRER, supra note 224, at 6B.
230. See Mental Health Courts, supra note 33; Shapiro, supra note 214; LIBN, supra
note 50; ENQUIRER, supra note 224, at 6B.
231. Shapiro, supra note 214.
232. See Mental Health Courts, supra note 33. The Harvard Mental Health Letter
discu'sses the findings of a survey of several MHC programs that after one year of being
processed through MHCs, the individuals had fewer arrests, greater life satisfaction,
better mental health, and less need for residential drug treatment. An Alaska study found
that before participating in a MHC, the average days in a mental hospital was 18 and the
average days in jail was 85, while after participating in a MHC program, the average days
in a mental hospital was 3 and the average days in jail was 16. A Florida study found that
individuals processed through MHCs spent 75% less days in jail than individuals
processed normally in the criminal system. Id. The authors of the Harvard Mental
Health Letter note that all of the above studies were random assignment rather than
controlled. They do cite one Santa Barbara, California study that was controlled and
found equal re-arrest rates and time spent in jail. However, it is important to note that the
study also found that MHC participants were more likely to be rearrested for parole
violations rather than new crimes.
233. See Cooper, supra note 24.
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saved more than $10 million of county funds and $13 million of state funds
by reduced jail and prison costs.234 Connecticut found that the average cost
per person for hospitalization plus incarceration in the first 90 days
following arraignment was only $1322 for offenders in a jail diversion
program compared to $3819 for those not diverted.23 5
Tammy Seltzer, writing for the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, argues that MHCs, if used at all, should only be used for
more serious offenses. She states that mentally ill offenders with minor
charges should be diverted either at prebooking or at arraignment and that
MHCs are appropriate only for those who cannot be diverted at those early
stages, essentially those with more serious offenses. 2 37 Seltzer argues that
by relying too heavily on MHCs as a solution for treating mental illness, not
enough attention is being given to correct the deficiencies in the health
system, which should reach the mentally ill before they ever offend.238
Under her logic, MIOTCRA should not only permit MHCs to include
violent offenders, but should also exclude non-violent minor misdemeanor
offenders from participating in MHCs. Non-violent minor misdemeanor
offenders should be handled in the health system without any processing in
the criminal justice system.
An Example: Brooklyn Mental Health Court
An example of a MHC that chooses to focus on seriously mentally ill
offenders who are chronic misdemeanor offenders or felony offenders,
rather than minor misdemeanant offenders, is the Brooklyn MHC
(BMHC). 239 Due to its belief, like many other MHCs, that treatment should
not last longer than what the typical sentence would be for an underlying
offense in a standard court proceeding, BMHC stakeholders chose to accept
felons because they felt for treatment to be truly effective it had to be for a
234. See id.
235. Div. OF FORENSIC SCI., CONN. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH & ADDICTION SERVS.,
JAIL DIVERSION (June 21, 2001), available at www.dmhas.state.ct.us/infobriefs.htm.
236. Seltzer, supra note 33, at 577.
237. Id. at 577-78.
238. Id. at 581-83. Seltzer points out that the "criminal and juvenile justice systems
are not the appropriate front door to access mental health care." Id. at 583.
239. The Brooklyn MHC was opened in 2002. Pyne, supra note 205.
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period longer than a simple misdemeanant sentence would permit.
2 40
Research has shown that outpatient commitment orders of six months or
longer "have fewer hospitalizations, shorter hospital stays, greater adherence
to community treatment, fewer acts of violence, and fewer instances of
victimization than patients receiving similar services under outpatient
commitment orders for shorter periods." 24 1 While the BMHC originally did
not accept violent felons, it changed its policy "as it became clear that
mental illness was sometimes an underlying factor leading to violent
crimes. ' 242 As of June 2006, violent offenders accounted for 42% of the 562
total referrals and 43% of the 262 participants.
24 3
The mission of BMHC is to treat its participants effectively and
increase public safety by reducing recidivism and stopping the "revolving
door. ' 244 The fact that these participants were slipping through the cracks in
the health care system is apparent in the finding that while 70% of the 106
participants enrolled in the program as of June 30, 2004 had been
hospitalized for psychiatric reasons at least once, only 30% were in
treatment at the time of the arrest.24 5 To be eligible for BMHC, a defendant
must plead guilty and "must have a 'serious and persistent mental illness' for
which there is a known treatment." 246 A psychiatric assessment is required
prior to program acceptance to determine clinical eligibility and also to
devise an individualized treatment plan in order to properly account for
247public safety and manage risk. If an offender is considered to possess too
high of a risk for violence or possesses too low of a likelihood of successful
treatment completion, they are screened out of BMHC.2 4 8 Referrals can
240. O'KEEFE, supra note 16, at iii, 9.
241. Fisler, supra note 30, at 591.
242. O'KEEFE, supra note 16, at 57.
243. Id. at 26.
244. Id. at iii, 1.
245. Id. at vi, 47.
246. Id. at iii, 8; Fisler, supra note 30, at 593.
247. O'KEEFE, supra note 16, at iv.
248. Fisler, supra note 30, at 593.
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come from competency proceedings, judges, defense attorneys, prosecutors,
and other specialized problem-solving courts. 2 49  The judge and the
250
prosecutor can unilaterally deny a defendant participation in BMHC.
The treatment program under BMHC consists of four phases: "(1)
adjustment in treatment; (2) engagement in treatment; (3) progress in
treatment; and (4) continued progress and preparing to graduate., The
length of each period depends on the length "of the mandate, with the
exception of the first phase, which lasts three months from the plea date."
252
A wide range of mental health services may be employed, including day
treatment programs, individual therapy, intensive psychiatric rehabilitation
treatment programs, psychosocial clubs, and assertive community treatment
(ACT) teams 53  The MHC can also order "supported housing, which
includes both community residences with 24-hour on-site staff and
supported apartment programs with less intensive clinical support." 254 In
addition to mental health services, treatment plans can include substance
abuse treatment, case management, education, and employment services.
255
Following successful completion, all charges are dismissed or reduced. 6
The Center for Court Innovation conducted a process evaluation and
preliminary outcome evaluation of BMHC. 57  Of importance to this
comment, 37% of the offenders in the period covered by the study had
249. O'KEEFE, supra note 16, at 15. "[P]roblem-solving courts include specialized
drug courts, domestic violence courts, community courts, and family treatment courts."
Id. at 1. These specialized courts "seek to improve the outcomes for victims,
communities, and defendants." Id.
250. Fisler, supra note 30, at 597.
251. O'KEEFE, supra note 16, at 29.
252. Id. at 29.
253. Fisler, supra note 30, at 595.
254. Id. at 596.
255. Id. at 595.
256. Id. at 593.
257. Id. at 601.
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violent felony charges. 258 Overall BMHC had positive effects on recidivism,
hospitalizations, homelessness, substance use, and psychosocial
functioning29 While 78% had at least one arrest prior to program
participation and 27% had been arrested in the year prior to program
participation, only 16% were arrested in the first year after enrollment.
260
As for hospitalizations, while 50% of the participants had been hospitalized
for psychiatric reasons the year prior to their involvement with BMHC, only
19% had hospitalizations the year after their enrollment. 26 Using the Health
of the Nation Outcome Scale (HoNOS) at intake and at the twelve-month
follow-up to measure psychosocial functioning, "participants showed
statistically significant improvements on the scales measuring problems with
cognition, depressed moods, living conditions, and occupations and
activities. ' '262 Along with these praiseworthy results, the "unusually high
one-year program retention rate of 83% suggests that the Brooklyn Mental
Health Court has a meaningful positive effect on its participants."
Ann Swern of the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, in speaking
about BMHC, said, "We are making an investment in treatment in order to
prevent the reoccurrence of crime-particularly violent crime-by offenders
with mental illness. '264 For that same reason, MIOTCRA should encourage
MHCs to accept violent offenders, rather than exclude them. BMHC has
demonstrated that these courts can successfully "identify, assess, and
monitor offenders with mental illness; and . . . link offenders with mental
258. O'KEEFE, supra note 16, at 48. The evaluation period covered BMHC's
"planning process, which began in 2001, and its first twenty-eight months of operations
(March 2002-June 2004)." Id. at iii.
259. Id. at 58.
260. Id. at vii, 53.
261. Id. at vii, 52-53.
262. Id. at 53-54. The HoNOS (The Royal College of Psychiatrists' Research Unit,
2002) was designed by The Royal College of Psychiatrists and has proven to be reliable
and valid. It "is comprised of 12 scales ... [which are] scored from 0 (no problem) to 4
(severe to very severe problem)." Id. at viii. The scales "measure a wide range of health
and social domains." Id. at 53.
263. Id. at 58.
264. Fisler, supra note 30, at 593.
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illness to appropriate mental health treatment services"2 65 to address both
mental health treatment needs and public safety concerns.
266
SECTION B: Assertive Community Treatment/Assisted Outpatient Treatment
Some jurisdictions, including those that have MHCs, may use
assertive community treatment (ACT) or assisted outpatient treatment
(AOT) programs as diversion programs for mentally ill offenders.
67
Depending on the program, mentally ill offenders can be diverted at various
points, whether by a police officer arriving on scene, mental health
professionals in mobile crisis teams, or through the courts. 26 8 The rationale
under these programs, like for MHCs, is that the offender would never have
ended up in the criminal justice system if he or she would have received the
necessary treatment in the community. 269 Thus, ACTs and AOTs provide an
outpatient model of care to ensure these individuals are receiving all of the
treatment and assistance they need in the community to effectively manage
their illness and abide by the laws. 27  The services they provide include
"medications and medication management, case management services,
housing assistance, substance abuse treatment, vocational supports and
mobile crisis management." 271 A treatment team is available 24 hours a day,
365 days a year for participants.2
72
The goal of ACTs and AOTs "is not to make presently dangerous
individuals nondangerous. ' 273  Rather, the mentally ill participants are
presumed to not be dangerous while under the care and supervision of the
265. O'KEEFE, supra note 16, at viii, 57.
266. Id. at 1.
267. See Honberg & Gruttadaro, supra note 24, at 24; Heyrman, supra note 8, at 393-
97.
268. Lamb, Weinberger & Gross, supra note 24, at 121.
269. Heyrman, supra note 8, at 394.
270. Id. at 394.
271. Honberg & Gruttadaro, supra note 24, at 24.
272. Heyrman, supra note 8, at 395-96.
273. Lamb, Weinberger & Gross, supra note 24, at 114.
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program.2 74 Therefore, while ACTs and AOTs may not be appropriate for
cases such as murder, it may be appropriate for a mentally ill offender with a
less severe violent charge. 275  It is important to remember that under
MIOTCRA, a mentally ill offender is defined as being "violent" if he or she
just threatened violence or committed a felony that involved a mere risk of
violence to either a person or property.
276
When outpatient treatment is court-ordered, the participants remain
under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system and their outpatient
status can be revoked, or other conseqdences given, if they do not comply
277with the program. Outpatient treatment is a proficient way to "balance the
patient's liberty interests with the State's interest in protecting the mentally
ill individual and the community."2 78 As for the effectiveness of ACTs and
AOTs, "there is a large body of literature documenting the success of these
programs in reducing hospitalizations, homelessness, arrests and other
consequences of untreated mental illnesses ' ' 27 9 such as violence and
victimization. 2 8  They have been found to improve treatment compliance
and substance abuse treatment.
2 8 1
274. Id.
275. This comment uses the word "may not be appropriate" in regards to a murder
charge because there are times arguably that ACT or AOT may be appropriate a mentally
ill offender that commits murder. An example may be in a case involving post-partum
depression.
276. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, § 2991(a)(8),
118 Stat. at 2329.
277. Lamb, Weinberger & Gross, supra note 24, 117-18; Winchell, supra note 11, at
211; AOT, supra note 30.
278. Winchell, supra note 11, at 229.
279. Honberg & Gruttadaro, supra note 24, at 24 (citing NAMI, PACT: PROGRAM OF
ASSERTIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT (2003), available at http://www.nami.org).
280. AOT, supra note 30.
281. Id.
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An Example: The Nathaniel Project
An example of an ACT program that accepts violent mentally ill
offenders is the Nathaniel Project in New York City.282  The Nathaniel
Project, which started in 2000, is run by the Center for Alternative
Sentencing and Employment Services (CASES) and is an alternative only
for those offenders diagnosed with an Axis I disorder and who are prison-
bound for felonies, including violent offenses.283  Many participants are
homeless and have co-occurring substance abuse problems.
284
Approximately 50% of participants are charged with violent crimes and 75%
of participants have a history of violence. 285  Rather than incarceration,
participants receive two years of intensive case management and community
supervision under the program.
286
Anyone can refer criminal defendants to the Nathaniel Project,
287although most referrals come from court personnel. The program
conducts its own multi-step screening and risk-assessment to decide which
offenders are appropriate participants. Once the Nathaniel Project decides
to accept a defendant, staff members go to the court to advocate for the
offender to be released into the program.289 Prior to entry, the participants
plead guilty and then sign a contract to participate in the program that is
282. CTR. FOR ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING & EMPLOYMENT SERVS. (CASES), MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAMS: NATHANIEL PROJECT, available at http://www.cases.org/
np sub3.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter CASES].
283. Seltzer, supra note 33, at 585; Psychiatric Services, Significant Achievement
Awards: The Nathaniel Project- An Effective Alternative to Incarceration, 10
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1314, 1314 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org [hereinafter Awards].
284. Seltzer, supra note 33, at 585.
285. CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING GROUP, ALAMEDA COUNTY BHCS MHSA, THE
NATHANIEL PROJECT 1 (2005), available at http://www.bhcs.co.alameda.ca.us/MHSA/
DocCtr/CJ/The%20Nathaniel%20Project.pdf [hereinafter ALAMEDA].
286. Seltzer, supra note 33, at 585.
287. CASES, supra note 282.
288. Id.
289. NATHANIEL PROJECT, supra note 24, at 2.
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290
entered into the court record, at which point the sentencing is adjourned.
Participants live in supervised housing or receive residential treatment.
29'
The case workers must see their clients at least three times a week
during the first two months, then at least twice a week for the next two
months, followed by at least once a week for the last eight months of their
first year in the program. 22 During the second year, the case management
293changes to a monthly supervision model. At all times during the program,
someone is available on call twenty-four hours a day. 29 4  In addition to
mental health care, the program ensures that participants are taught living
skills such as money management, and have the financial resources,
including access to public benefits, for medications and any other essentials
295
they need such as food and clothing. The participants attend periodic
court progress dates and, following successful completion of the program,
296their criminal charges are reduced or dismissed.
The Nathaniel Project has produced positive results in working with
297
mentally ill offenders who commit serious crimes. The program retains
80% of its clients for the full two years and 79% had permanent housing
after one year in the program. 298 The number of arrests for participants
dropped from 101 in the year prior to entry to just 7 in the year following
entry.29 9 The Nathaniel Project is a cost-effective solution when its $14,578
290. ALAMEDA, supra note 285, at 3.
291. Id. at5.
292. CASES, supra note 282.
293. Id. By the second year, "[p]articipants are expected to have a stable living
situation, to be engaged in treatment, and to have developed a community-based support
network." Id
294. ALAMEDA, supra note 285, at 5.
295. Awards, supra note 283, at 1314; CASES, supra note 282.
296. ALAMEDA, supra note 285, at 4.
297. Id at 6; Awards, supra note 283, at 1315.
298. ALAMEDA, supra note 285, at 6; Awards, supra note 283, at 1315.
299. ALAMEDA, supra note 285, at 6.
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annual cost for a participant is compared to the $29,678 annual cost to
provide services in a state prison or the $53,224 annual cost to provide
services in a city jail. 300
The Nathaniel Project demonstrates that appropriate violent mentally ill
offenders can be successfully treated in the community.30 1 The program has
never turned a mentally ill offender away due to the severity of the crime
committed or the offender's past history of violence.30 2 Rather than look at
crime level, it looks at actual risk to the public.30 3 MIOTCRA similarly
should not look at crime level in determining which mentally ill offenders
are appropriate for diversion programs.
CONCLUSION
While the problem of criminalizing the mentally ill is commendably
being targeted on the federal level by MIOTCRA, more needs to be done to
adequately account for violent mentally ill offenders. Treating violent
mentally ill offenders, otherwise appropriate for diversion programs under
MIOTCRA, under traditional criminal procedures is neither effective nor
efficient. While a case such as Eric Clark's involves the extreme violent act
of murder, it demonstrates the loopholes in the health system and the need to
ensure that appropriate mentally ill offenders, even after committing violent
offenses, receive effective treatment. Incarcerating offenders with treatable
mental illnesses, of which their crime was the product, serves no deterrent or
rehabilitative purpose. It costs society more, both in terms of finances and
safety, to continue to fail to appropriately treat this population of offenders.
While many diversion programs exist without MIOTCRA funding,
and therefore are not subject to its non-violent limitation, MIOTCRA should
still be amended. MIOTCRA was designed to determine ways to reduce
recidivism and better protect society from breakdowns in the health system.
Under MIOTCRA's own purpose and goals, in addition the requirements of
the Eighth Amendment, violent mentally ill offenders should not be
automatically excluded from diversion programs. Also, MIOTCRA cannot
exclude diversion programs from experimenting with violent offenders if its
duty to provide a list of "best practices" for handling the mentally ill is going
to truly be fulfilled. While it may be politically easier and safer to exclude
300. Awards, supra note 283, at 1315.
301. NATHANIEL PROJECT, supra note 24, at 2.
302. Id. at 2.
303. Id.
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violent offenders, Congress needs to be accountable and do what is
necessary to make society aware of "the enormous social and financial costs
associated with the irrationality of charging and sentencing persons whose
severe mental disorders are manifested as criminal conduct to an unending
cycle of incarceration, decompensation, release, reoffense, arrest,
sentencing, and reincarceration. '3 °4
304. Stone, supra note 86, at 358.
